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Preface
This brief by Research Scholar Greg Hannsgen and me evaluates
the current path of fiscal deficits in the United States in the con-
text of government debt and further spending, economic recov-
ery, and unemployment. We are adamant that there is no
justification for the belief that cutting spending or raising taxes
by any amount will reduce the federal deficit, let alone permit
solid growth. The worst fears about recent stimulative policies
and rapid money-supply growth are proving to be incorrect once
again. We must find the will to reinvigorate government and to
maintain Keynesian macro stimulus in the face of ideological
opposition and widespread mistrust of government. 
Very high deficits are necessary for at least a few more years
because of a dire economic situation. Moreover, we need to 
prevent another crisis by tightening regulation of the financial
industry. Fiscal policy, while highly potent, has limited power, so
we must strive for more profound reforms—for example, pre-
venting loans that are likely to lead to bankruptcy, banning mort-
gage-related financial innovations that jeopardize borrowers,
strengthening the bond-rating system, preventing dubious assets
from being moved off the balance sheets of financial companies,
returning to the use of the discount window (and reducing reliance
on the federal funds market), and fostering community devel-
opment financial institutions that address the needs of econom-
ically distressed communities.
We note that the financial boom-bust cycle observed by
Hyman P. Minsky is still very much in evidence. America’s cur-
rent fiscal stance is part and parcel of the recession and financial
crisis, and not the product of political whims. Moreover, the
deficit cannot be treated as a policy problem when it is a nearly
inevitable result of low economic growth, which reduces tax rev-
enues. Furthermore, deficit spending helps the private sector, and
the effects of higher deficits have moderated, and ultimately
ended, most postwar U.S. recessions. 
A good fiscal policy takes advantage of the benefits of auto-
matic stabilizers (income taxes and unemployment benefits) 
that lead to increased spending during recessions without special
legislation or government stimulus packages. In fact, Minsky was
an early proponent of what we regard as a nearly ideal automatic
stabilizer—an employer-of-last-resort program. However, we
remain pessimistic about employment recovery in light of the
narrow focus of the fiscal policy stance, combined with the near
absence of many stabilizers that helped in the past. 
According to a tally of total liabilities of our consolidated
“federal sector,” we find that federal government and Federal
Reserve liabilities as a percent of quarterly GDP are much less
now than they were at the beginning of 1947, so we are not in
uncharted territory. On the other hand, government-sponsored
entities (GSEs) and their mortgage pools have added more than
40 percent to federal sector liabilities. The mortgage-backed
securities on the Fed’s books are there to reduce interest rates on
mortgages. And as long as the U.S. government provides its
nearly explicit backing, GSE mortgage-backed securities should
be easy to sell. In fact, there is no reason to sell these assets unless
there is a need to influence interest rates on mortgages as well as
other long-term interest rates.
It is time to mend some of the holes in the U.S. social safety
net. Poverty and unemployment rates are trending upward, and
these adverse effects of the recession are strongly affecting many
of the poorest groups, including minorities. Initiatives that address
key economic problems at the household level—such as an
employer-of-last-resort program—can never bankrupt a sover-
eign nation like the United States.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
August 2010Public Policy Brief, No. 114 4
Introduction
The U.S. federal deficit for the 2010 fiscal year is expected to
equal about 10 percent of GDP. This seems like a large sum,and
it is certainly far larger than most deficits incurred since about
1950. However, deficits need to be better understood and per-
haps better measured, along with their potential benefits.
One must keep in mind that there has been panic about
budget deficits before. Recall that independent presidential can-
didate Ross Perot may have swung the outcome of the 1992 elec-
tion in favor of Bill Clinton with his attacks on deficit spending.
At the time, the federal deficit was about 5.7 percent of GDP, and
interest in new political movements was growing much as it is now.
Today, as then, deficit critics invoke the term “bankrupt”—
but that adjective does not describe the United States or its gov-
ernment. Indeed, the term suggests a situation that rarely applies
to advanced countries or their governments (Galbraith 2006).1
Sovereign default (the failure of a national government to pay
back borrowed money) is certainly common, but not in U.S. his-
tory. Countries with sovereign currencies, borrowing in their
own currency, can never go bankrupt. They can be, at the extreme,
shut out of international capital markets. But this remains very
unlikely for the United States, with its currency still maintaining
its role as the main international reserve currency. Indeed, most
key interest rates continue to trend downward, indicating that
fears of a sharp drop in the dollar (let alone a collapse) are sec-
ondary to far more immediate concerns about growth, unem-
ployment, and poverty.
On the other hand, there have been plenty of real bankrupt-
cies: 1.4 million Americans declared bankruptcy last year (BDP
2010). These bankruptcies were mostly due not to personal failings
or bad character but to the problems that we as a society have failed
to address. And these bankruptcies were mostly the result of prob-
lems that are within society’s power to ameliorate: victimization by
fraudulent or imprudent financial practices; an economy with
more than four job seekers for every opening (BLS 2010b, 2010c);
and a medical system in which many Americans resort to the use
of credit cards to pay hospital bills. Hence, an adequate remedy for
excessive debt should address the ways individuals incur debt by
reforming the legislative process, campaign finances, lending prac-
tices, consumer regulations, and education. Also, work on the
health care system may have to continue even now that a landmark
reform bill has been passed. We will give some suggestions about
the new regulations and laws needed near the end of this paper. 
Yet the national debt and its size are very important politi-
cal and economic issues. Indeed, as the case of Ross Perot
reminds us, they were the subject of a vigorous debate even when
deficits were much smaller. Another example is the 1970s, when
the highest deficit was 4.2 percent of GDP (Congressional Budget
Office [CBO] 2010a). Perhaps the reason for such deep-seated
fears and controversy lies in the images that growing debts con-
jure up. One thinks of a cancer rapidly expanding and consum-
ing a healthy body. Indeed, James K. Galbraith warned of the
dangers of “radical surgery” on the federal budget (Galbraith
2006, p. 1). But the deficit issue cannot be thought of separately
from the national crises that have led to the current fiscal situa-
tion. A deficit equal to about 10 percent of GDP certainly reflects
deep problems in the case of the United States—including the
most severe financial crisis and recession since World War II.
Using postwar data from industrialized and emerging economies,
Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2009, p. 170) estimate
that real public debt increased on average by 86 percent in the
three years following a major banking crisis. 
This raises an interesting question: how much of the current
deficit is merely the inevitable result of a severe recession and
financial crisis, however damaging it might be to fiscal health;and
how much reflects freer spending by Congress and the president?
In a report and accompanying dataset released in January,
the CBO (2010a) estimates that the recent recession and shaky
recovery contributed 2 percentage points to the total 2009 federal
deficit of 9.3 percent of potential GDP. As an estimate of the
budgetary impact of the weak economy, this number is on the
low side because neither the stimulus plan nor other recession-
related but discretionary spending is included. On the other
hand, according to the CBO, stimulus bill spending for 2009
amounted to only seven-tenths of a percent of GDP (CBO 2010a,
p. 96). By the CBO’s definition, discretionary spending (often
thought of by conservatives as the big problem)increased by only
1.2 percent of GDP from 2007 to 2009. By contrast, “mandatory
expenditures” (those required by Social Security rules, welfare
eligibility rules, et cetera) increased by 4.5 percent of GDP.
Means-tested benefit programs—a category that includes the
program formerly known as food stamps, as well as unemploy-
ment benefits and supplemental security income (SSI)—grew by
72 percent in nominal terms between 2007 and 2009. Of course,
this trend can be blamed mostly on the recession and financial
crisis, and the government’s response to these events. Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
Meanwhile, tax revenues fell from 18.5 percent to 14.8 per-
cent of national output in that period. Once Congress sets tax
policy, it is the strength of the economy that determines tax rev-
enues. The stimulus bill accounts for 0.6 percentage points of
this 3.7 percentage-point decline. The point of stating these facts
is not to claim that the budget deficit is unrelated to recent polit-
ical decisions, but to make it clear that America’s current fiscal
stance is part and parcel of the recession and financial crisis, and
not the product of political whims. 
To use a historical analogy, Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt
faced strong headwinds early in the Great Depression when the
deficit reached then-unprecedented levels (Hannsgen and
Papadimitriou 2010). Some observers fuss over the size of
Roosevelt’s relief and public works programs. They should keep
in mind that these programs directly employed about 2.2 to 3.7
million workers in each of the first 10 years of his administra-
tion, while unemployment reached nearly 11 million in 1932 and
stayed above 4.9 million from 1931 through 1940, according to
adjusted official figures (see Darby 1976, p. 7, Table 2). Moreover,
state- and local-level government employment had plummeted,
complicating Roosevelt’s task. 
Roosevelt faced strong opposition to his deficit-spending
policies and despite a widespread sense of fiscal imprudence, the
New Deal jobs programs never reached the size necessary to deal
with Depression-era unemployment. It would have been uncon-
scionable to do much less, yet Keynesianism was hard to sell even
to a nation desperate for recovery. Hence, workers hired for fed-
eral employment programs were often laid off when there was
no sign of job openings in the private sector.
The best way to think of recent deficits is as a logical and
necessary response to a severe recession, as they were in the
Depression. Even CEO David M. Walker of the Peter G. Petersen
Foundation, an antideficit think tank, earlier this year joined
President Lawrence Mishel of the Economic Policy Institute in
acknowledging that the United States must address “jobs now
and deficits later” (Mishel and Walker 2010). Their February 24
op-ed in Politico cites the “moral imperative” to provide jobs
when one-fifth of Americans are unemployed or underem-
ployed, as well as the long-term costs and the effects of mass
unemployment, including reduced future earnings for affected
workers. Mishel and Walker call for two years of elevated
deficits.2Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that the unemployment
rate will fall very far within that time span. The Fed governors
and bank presidents forecast in June that unemployment will fall
to between 8.3 and 8.7 percent in 2011 and between 7.1 to 7.5
percent in 2012 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System 2010). More recent private sector forecasts indicate that
average unemployment will remain above 9 percent in 2010 and
2011 (Willis and Scheuble 2010).
We are pessimistic about employment recovery, as well.
Hence, more stimulus may be needed over a longer period than
Mishel and Walker believed when they wrote their article in
February. We hope that widespread agreement on the need for
fiscal stimulus will continue when the one-fifth unemployed and
underemployed figure cited by Mishel and Walker falls to one-
tenth or one-twentieth, though there will always be disagree-
ments on the exact amount of stimulus needed. Some
perspective might help here: during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s,
many western European economies enjoyed prolonged periods
of unemployment below 3 percent!3
Government Budget Deficits: Indispensible Tool for
Economic Stability
How can fiscal policy be used effectively at a time when the
budget deficit and the unemployment rate are both at frighten-
ing levels? A good fiscal policy takes advantage of the benefits of
“automatic stabilizers” (e.g., income taxes and unemployment
benefits) that automatically lead to increased deficits during
recessions without special legislation, as well as “stimulus pack-
ages,” though the latter term is a relatively new one. Hyman P.
Minsky was an early proponent of what we regard as perhaps the
best automatic stabilizer: an employer-of-last-resort (ELR) pro-
gram, which would offer a job to anyone who met a minimal set
of eligibility criteria (see Papadimitriou 1999 for more details on
this idea). In general, “entitlements,” derided by fiscal conserva-
tives, make it difficult to control spending but often help insure
that spending is highest when it is needed most. 
Another reason for additional social spending during times
of higher unemployment and underemployment is the near
absence of many stabilizers that helped in the past. One example
of a now-defunct automatic stabilizer is the Aid for Dependent
Children (AFDC) program, which provided cash benefits to mil-
lions of low-income single parents. “Reforms” to this program
that were implemented in the late 1990s did not immediately
bring the sharp increase in female and child poverty that some
expected, partly because of a strong job market at the time, as
reflected in a steadily falling unemployment rate for womenPublic Policy Brief, No. 114 6
(Figure 1). Hence, some felt affirmed in their judgment that
AFDC did little good, even for its recipients. However, since 2000,
poverty rates for most groups have gradually trended upward,
including a notable increase in poverty for households without
a husband that is approaching 40 percent. This trend has coin-
cided with a rise in the unemployment rate for women over age
19,from 3.6 percent in 2000 to approximately 8 percent so far this
year. Reforms to the welfare system appear to have worked only
when help for the poor was needed least—in a strong job market.
There are important reasons why the poor are among those
most affected by a weak economy.  Labor economists have long
noted that the workers in the poorest groups—including minori-
ties, those with less education, and welfare recipients—tend to be
the last in line for new jobs and the first to lose them. They often
lack seniority and hold positions with little job security. Hence,
automatic stabilizers are needed to alleviate a burden—mass
unemployment—that falls especially heavily on many groups
that lack resources to begin with. Hence, a great deal of thought
must be given to targeting help to the poor and the unemployed.
Given the lessons we have learned recently about how vulnera-
ble these groups are, it may be time to mend some of the holes
in the social safety net dating from the 1980s and 1990s with 
simple, nonstigmatizing, cost-effective programs that make the
best use of people’s talents, skills, and ambitions. 
This approach—improving and creating programs that
directly address key economic problems at the household level—
would certainly not bankrupt a nation like the United States.
Though the pre-Reagan U.S. welfare state was deeply flawed, it
can be viewed as a benchmark providing a sense of the scale of
the expenditures required for a large and ambitious program to
aid the poor. AFDC cost the federal and state governments about
$12.0 billion in 1980 (DHHS 2010), or $30.1 billion in today’s
dollars. Over the life of the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP), the government will be providing a net $36 billion in
assistance to the insurance firm AIG, a figure that is only slightly
higher (CBO 2010b, p. 3). And AIG is just one corporation. The
total federal deficit for 2009 was approximately $1.4 trillion—
46 times the inflation-adjusted costs of the much-maligned
AFDC program before the cuts of the 1980s and 1990s. Although
Minsky criticized the federal government for not doing enough
to help people with low or moderate incomes, he was also highly
critical of programs that merely paid for needed consumption
goods because he believed that they caused inflation (Minsky
2008 [1986], p. 26). However, along with his proposal for an ELR
program, he supported a universal children’s allowance that
would be available to all families, regardless of income (p. 301).4 
Such programs are costly. But it is important to consider
even seemingly grandiose options when extremely large bailout
programs are justified, for the most part, on the grounds of
kitchen-table economics.
Any deficit spending, whether oriented toward business or
households, helps the private sector, which must thrive in a capi-
talist system to provide a tax base and the bulk of commodities. In
his book Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, Minsky cited three main
mechanisms through which fiscal policy stabilized the economy
(pp. 13–37). During a recession, higher deficits increase (1) gov-
ernment demand for goods and services; (2) the surpluses of the
private and/or foreign sectors; and (3) the stock of very-low-risk
financial assets in private portfolios. Minsky documented that
these three effects were among the main forces behind most post-
war economic recoveries. The second effect is a corollary of the
national accounting identity, which is emphasized in our Strategic
Analysis reports (e.g., Zezza 2010 is the most recent issue), and all
three effects remain potent. 
Also, we hasten to add that Minsky generally approved of
the kind of lender-of-last-resort actions taken by the Fed since
Poverty Rate for Families with a Female Householder and at Least One
Child under Age 18, and No Husband Present (left scale)
Unemployment Rate (standard definition) for Women over Age 19
(right scale)








Figure 1 The Link between the Poverty Rate and the
Unemployment Rate for a Key Demographic Group
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2008, though he might have objected to the specific steps that
the Fed took to stabilize the financial sector during the recent
crisis. Minsky’s view was largely a matter of pragmatism in the
face of profound threats to the functioning of an economy. 
We have a badly ailing economy. When it comes to policy, we
should follow the tradition of political economists going back to
the French physiocrats and Adam Smith, and think in terms of
a cure for the whole body, which functions well when goods,
services, and assets are produced and circulate properly. The
deficit cannot possibly be treated as the main problem when it is
the product of a poorly functioning economy. The institutions of
the economic system must adapt, and the deficit is an important
part of the healing process. Also, some attention has to be given to
wounds, illnesses, and other immediate threats to well-being, which
necessitate direct aid to households that increases in hard times.
Trends in the Federal Debt and the Stock of Money:
How Unpleasant?
Nonetheless, there are some questions in the media about
whether these recent deficit projections really “add up.” Common
sense seems to tell us this is the crucial question. Is there any
objective way one can decide if the current path of fiscal deficits
will lead us off the tracks? There are many uncertainties about
what deficits mean for economic performance, but perhaps the
only sure thing is the government budget constraint. Roughly
speaking, the government’s spending in excess of tax revenues
and other government receipts must equal increases in the gov-
ernment’s liabilities: 
Gt - Tt = =Lt – Lt-1(1 + it)
In this identity, the t subscripts indicate the calendar quarter. G
represents government spending, T stands for taxes and other
government revenues, Lis liabilities, and iis the interest rate. The
first three variables are expressed in dollars or any other currency.
(We include net transfers under the rubric “spending.” Sales and
purchases of assets can also finance spending, but we leave those
out of the identity for the sake of simplicity, assuming that no
such transactions occur.) In the case of the U.S. government,
these liabilities are mostly those of the Federal Reserve (especially
paper currency and the banks’ reserve “deposits” at the Fed) and
Treasury securities, including savings bonds and Treasury bills.
The budget constraint, by itself, has few direct implications for
the effectiveness of any particular policy, but it places limits on
what is possible. For example, high deficits are impossible with-
out a rapidly growing supply of federal liabilities, a category that
includes government bonds, currency, and reserves held by banks
at the Fed. Putting such liabilities on private sector balance
sheets,where they help fill holes created by the housing bust and
financial crisis, is one of the three ways mentioned above that
the government can fight recessions. 
Figure 2 shows how the government has been using its abil-
ity to generate assets for other sectors of the economy. An entity we
call the “federal sector” includes (1) the Fed, (2) the federal gov-
ernment, and (3) a combined entity that includes both the gov-
ernment-sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac) and the mortgage pools that technically hold many
of their assets. Three of the lines on the figure separately show the
liabilities of each of the three sectors. Liabilities are excluded if they
are held as assets by any of the sector’s three components. The top
line is the sum of the other lines and represents a measure of the
liabilities of the entire federal sector to entities outside the sector. 
Total Liabilities of Consolidated “Federal Sector” (Sum of All Items)
Federal Government
Federal Reserve
GSEs and Federal Mortgage Pools
* Federal government, Federal Reserve, GSEs, and federal mortgage pools
Notes: Data points for 1947 through 1951 are interpolated from annual
observations using a linear technique. Quarterly observations are used for all
other years. The term "Federal Sector" has no legal meaning.
Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts; Federal Reserve Bank






































































































































Figure 2 Liabilities of Consolidated “Federal Sector”*
1947Q1–2010Q1 (in percent of  GDP)Public Policy Brief, No. 114 8
Our previous consolidated federal balance sheets (e.g.,
Papadimitriou and Hannsgen 2009) did not include the GSEs
and their mortgage pools. Some of the most important GSEs
were effectively taken over by the federal government in 2008
and have received large infusions of public funds. “Federal sec-
tor” is only a term we find convenient to describe the above com-
bination; it has no legal or political meaning.5 Nonetheless, it is
clear that it makes sense to think of this entity as a single unit,
since the parts are collectively responsible for the government’s
finances. For example, there is no doubt that the Fed coordinates
its activities carefully with those of the Treasury Department to
ensure that funds are available to pay for government operations
while,at the same time, interest-rate targets are met (Wray 1998;
Bell 2000). Similarly, the debt of the GSEs was never credibly
removed from the federal sector balance sheet, even after most
were formally privatized. The government knew that a major
financial crisis might occur if these organizations defaulted on
any of their debt, and that Washington would take much of the
blame—despite the fact that most GSEs were profit-making enti-
ties. Hence, investors and GSE insiders remained confident that
the government would take charge of the GSEs in the event of
imminent failure. 
Incidentally, we have left out the large portion of the gov-
ernment’s debt that technically is owned by the Social Security
Trust Funds; essentially, the bonds in these funds represent only
promises to tax or borrow money from the public to pay bene-
fits when they are due. The trust fund purchases bonds with pay-
roll tax revenues. These bond sales do not in themselves increase
or decrease the legal liabilities of the government to the public,
though the collection of payroll taxes reduces the amount of
money the government must “print” or borrow each year from
investors. Some similar “unmarketable” assets held by various
other federal retirement funds are also not considered true gov-
ernment liabilities for the purpose of constructing Figure 2.  
One bit of good news is that we are not in uncharted terri-
tory, even considering our somewhat unorthodox inclusion of
the GSEs in the aggregate federal sector. In the first quarter of
1947, the total liabilities of the federal sector were about 109.3
percent of GDP. In the first quarter of 2010, the figure rose by
2.3 percentage points over the previous quarter,to 111.1 percent
of GDP. In particular, federal government liabilities were 88.8
percent of GDP in 1947 and are now only 55.0 percent of GDP.
Meanwhile, Fed liabilities currently stand at about 14.4 percent
of GDP but equaled almost 19.5 percent of GDP in 1947. Hence,
without the GSEs, total federal sector liabilities in 2010 would be
far lower than they were in 1947. However, the GSEs and their
mortgage pools add 41.7 percent to federalsector liabilities, while
they did not reach even 1 percent of GDP in 1947. 
Obviously, these figures are stunning. However, while we
analyze the financial facts, we should keep in mind the other
staggering realities of our time, including unemployment that
has persisted at well over 9 percent. This rate will not come down
easily or quickly, and it does not begin to tally the human costs
of enforced idleness, including discouraged jobseekers who have
stopped looking for work. With such a dire situation, it is rea-
sonable that macroeconomic policy should be more stimulative
than at the height of the last recession or the one before that,
when unemployment stayed below 8 percent. Few politicians
overlook the fact that growth and employment must be main-
tained even at great cost, and fiscal prospects will only deterio-
rate further if they are not. (Even positive, but moderate, growth
will not be enough to revive tax revenues.) There is no justifica-
tion for the belief that cutting spending or raising tax rates by
any amount whatsoever will reduce the federal deficit, let alone
permit solid growth. Indeed, government revenues depend on
the performance of the economy, not just government policy.
And any foreseeable policy that does not encourage growth also
cannot reduce the deficit. That is where economic models and
good policy come in—not with a simple edict or rule about the
size of the deficit. 
Before we turn to future prospects, it is worth taking a quick
look at a breakdown of the Fed’s assets,because its balance sheet
has changed rapidly since the financial crisis began in earnest in
late 2008. There has been much hand-wringing over the Fed’s
possible difficulties in selling off the assets it has acquired in its
efforts to cleanse the financial sector’s balance sheets. It is some-
times thought that perhaps the Fed would not be able to sell
enough of the assets on its balance sheet if it needed to reduce the
stock of bank reserves and U.S. currency. However, it seems
unlikely to us that the Fed would have problems reducing its
holdings of garden-variety assets such as government bonds. It
does so routinely, of course, with the understanding that inter-
est rates usually rise when private investors are called upon to
hold more of the government’s debt securities. Hence, the even-
tual decision to unwind the roughly $300 billion in Treasury
securities purchased since last March will only be a matter of
deciding upon the best interest-rate policy for the economy, and,
of course, avoiding a panic in the bond market by selling theLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
bonds gradually. In fact, there is no reason to bother selling Fed
assets unless there is a need to influence interest rates.
Likewise, the mortgage-backed securities on the Fed’s books
are there primarily to reduce interest rates on mortgages. Fannie
and Freddie are financially weak, with a government agency
backing the bonds that they use to borrow money and the mort-
gage-backed bonds that they underwrite and sell. (Fannie Mae’s
2009 financial report to the Securities and Exchange Commission
[2010, pp. 26–27] seems to state this explicitly, but its reports
before the 2008 takeover do not.) Few have ever doubted that the
government would step in if there were a danger of default by
any GSE. Ginnie Mae has always been owned by the government,
though it shares the “GSE” designation. As long as the govern-
ment provides its guarantee, the assets involved should be easy to
sell—a situation that has reduced spreads between the yields of
mortgage-backed securities and Treasury bonds to nearly zero
in recent weeks. The government stopped buying GSE bonds at
the end of March and plans to allow its holdings to fall gradually
as these securities reach maturity. GSE-related debt now com-
prises more than half of the Fed’s assets; these holdings do not
add to the total amount of liabilities shown in the chart, since
intrafederal debts are not included in liabilities of the GSEs
and/or the mortgage pools. 
When it comes to the Fed’s other assets, such as those
obtained in the rescue of AIG, the Fed’s ability to shrink its bal-
ance sheet will depend upon the markets’ views on the strength
of those assets. The bottom line is that if the Fed loses money on
these investments, the losses add to the deficit of the consoli-
dated federal sector. This presents no less or more of a financial
problem than new expenditure by the federal government or a
loss on similar holdings of the U.S. Treasury, though the account-
ing involved might not recognize these as identical financial events. 
Given the views of mainstream economists, intense financial
and journalistic interest in the exit from “quantitative expansion”
should come as no surprise. Since the mid-1990s, most U.S. neo-
classical economists have been convinced that proper monetary
policy could hold inflation in check. Economists tended to believe
that the Fed’s experience under Chairmen Volcker and Greenspan
had proven that this was possible. Many agreed with Milton
Friedman’s statement that “inflation is always and everywhere a
monetary phenomenon.” This accounts for the inflation-hawks’
recent focus on the process of shrinking the Fed’s balance sheet
and other monetary policy matters. Could they be missing the
greatest threat to inflation containment?
Recently, a paper presented at a conference in India argued
that high deficits could eventually undermine the low-inflation
economic regime often attributed to former Fed Chairman
Volcker and his successors (Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli
2010). The essence of the argument was that current high
deficits, in combination with tight money, might not prove sus-
tainable (see Sargent and Wallace 1981). In particular, prolonged
high deficits might eventually force an explosion of the money
supply and inflation, regardless of the central bank’s initial inten-
tions to keep inflation under control. These authors and others
believe that U.S. policymakers might be setting the stage for los-
ing control over inflation, owing to their overconfidence in the
effectiveness of interest-rate policy alone. They share the belief—
common among mainstream economists—that controlling the
money supply is the key to fighting and preventing inflation, but
doubt that the Fed will be able to choose a slow rate of money-
supply growth when huge deficits must be financed and old
debts paid off or refinanced. 
Arguments of any kind to the effect that the quantity of
money was the ultimate determinant of inflation met with skep-
ticism from most macroeconomists during their battle against
inflation in the 1970s and 1980s, despite the fact that monetarist
Friedman was beginning to gain adherents (including President
Reagan).Few believed that the growth rate of the money supply
could be controlled tightly, even for only a few months, or that
if it were, low inflation would be guaranteed. Of course, infla-
tion was brought in check and has stayed generally low for more
than 25 years. But this cannot be attributed to a successful effort
to target the growth rate of the money supply: the Fed overshot
its M1 and M2 targets consistently over a three-year period6—
the most determined effort by the U.S. central bank to adhere to
a monetary intermediate target. Even after the “monetarist exper-
iment” ended and the money supply continued to explode by
some measures, inflation stayed in check. No matter how suc-
cessful it was, then, the experiment cannot be cited as proof of
what might happen as the result of achieving a steady money-
supply growth rate. Obviously, then, other developments were
responsible for the elimination of serious inflation. The harsh
recession of 1980–82—for which tight monetary policy deserves
much of the blame—was largely responsible for the elimination of
inflation. In this case, the phrase “tight monetary policy” simply
means a remarkably high federal funds rate, which was certainly
achieved in the Volcker era to a far greater extent than a steadily
and slowly growing money supply. Public Policy Brief, No. 114 10
The worst fears about recent stimulative policy and rapid
money-supply growth are proving to be incorrect once again.
Indeed, the monetary base, a measure of the money supply often
preferred by monetarists, has grown by about 58 percent since
August 2008. This increase was already well under way by the
end of 2008, and there have been few inflationary reverberations,
with CPI inflation remaining under 3 percent since then. In
recent months, inflation has fallen well below the Fed’s informal
target range. Broader measures of the money supply, which
include bank accounts of various kinds, have also been increas-
ing, without triggering significant inflation. At the same time,
cash from the Fed has allowed many banks to repair their bal-
ance sheets, so that large financial institutions once facing bank-
ruptcy are now flush with reserves. If anything, this situation
again raises the question: couldn’t the government solve numer-
ous other, even more serious, problems the same way—by essen-
tially printing money and spending it as needed? Perhaps it could
have, though it took a profound threat to some of the largest and
most powerful U.S. companies to elicit such a rapid and huge
escalation of expenditures. 
A Proactive Approach to Controlling Expenditures:
Reduce Financial Risk-taking
The first part of this brief argued that very high deficits are nec-
essary for at least a few more years because of a dire economic sit-
uation that was mostly inherited from previous administrations,
especially that of George W. Bush. We also need to work to pre-
vent the emergence of another crisis by tightening regulation of
the financial industry, which was weakened greatly under previ-
ous administrations. The recently passed financial reform bill
may help and detailed research in the tradition of Hyman Minsky
continues at the Levy Institute and elsewhere. 
One can think of many useful reforms. At the level of con-
sumer protection, regulation can help prevent lenders from mak-
ing loans that are likely to lead to bankruptcy. For example,
so-called “payment option” mortgages, in which the borrower
has the option of putting off scheduled payments,have not proven
beneficial to consumers. Mortgage-related financial innovations
should be scrutinized before rollout, and banned if they jeop-
ardize borrowers. The bond-rating system should be strength-
ened to reduce conflicts of interest. Maneuvers of various kinds
to move dubious assets off the balance sheets of banks and other
financial companies have caused trouble, and should be prevented.
Adequate capital is always an issue. A return to the use of the dis-
count window—to reduce reliance on the federal funds mar-
ket—would also help. As in the past, the Fed would have the right
to scrutinize the balance sheets of banks seeking funds at the
window, enabling it to check the quality of assets. In addition,
the Fed could easily use the discount window to provide liquid-
ity to markets that were about to freeze up during crises.
Regulators should foster the existence of a large number of small-
or medium-size banks to reduce dependence on banks and
financial conglomerates that are “too big to fail.” An abundance
of relatively small competitors would make the financial system
more robust, and such firms would not need fewer firewalls
between various divisions with overlapping or conflicting inter-
ests. An important example of such firms is community devel-
opment financial institutions, many of which have effectively
addressed pressing needs in economically distressed communities
(Minsky et al. 1993). 
It is not always understood why the federal government has
spent so much money on bailouts over the years, yet the finan-
cial system remains unstable. TARP and other rescue measures
have favored the interests of large financial companies, but the
hand of government has been badly weakened in crises;officials
often have no choice but to agree to bailouts when the alterna-
tive is the collapse of major corporations and, indeed, of large
segments of the financial sector. The consequences of the 2007–
09 crisis would have been far worse in the event of a laissez-faire
policy toward failing institutions, and top officials at the Treasury
and Fed were well aware of a potential calamity. The government
insurance programs for banks have come under fire for encour-
aging financially reckless activities, but it is important to notice
that a firm like AIG enjoyed no formal government protection
but took great risks anyway. Of course, corporate officials took
great personal risks, but they were mindful that the government
would probably not be able to let one financial firm after another
fail, whether or not it had a formal agreement to protect them.
If Citibank, Bank of America, and other very large depository
institutions had not offered insured accounts, it is hard to imag-
ine that they would have been less likely than AIG to receive large
amounts of government help. 
Political scientist James O’Connor (2002 [1973]) pointed
out long ago that the impetus for fiscal crises,paradoxically, often
comes from the private sector. He argued that budget deficits
were increasing in the industrialized world because leaders 
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humming, or else lose their jobs. To do so, they had to provide
expensive help to large corporations, even when they would have
preferred to spend the money on other priorities. The latest run-
up in the deficit seems to fit O’Connor’s theory better than most
previous episodes of fiscal stimulus in U.S. history, partly because
such a huge sum of money was spent on an explicit effort to 
rescue the financial system. 
The financial fragility of the modern economy is likely to
remain a major threat to government finances. Minsky once
chided former Fed Chairman Arthur Burns for his view that
more zealous regulation would prevent financial crises. He
argued that financial instability was a “fundamental characteris-
tic of an economy with financial institutions such as those of the
United States” (Minsky 2008 [1986], p. 51). Economic history is
replete with examples of financial crises large and small. On the
other hand, Minsky certainly saw many potential benefits in reg-
ulatory reforms, and proposed numerous ideas for reform dur-
ing his career. 
Financial regulation has tended to be weak and the govern-
ment has often been forced to respond to crises ex post. Minsky
saw budget deficits, along with lender-of-last-resort actions by
central banks, as necessary and effective responses to incipient
crises. Yet “the effects of Big Government mean that an invest-
ment boom generates demand for finance that leads to another
bout of inflation and crisis” (p. 95). He believed that the result
was “a system that sustains instability even as it prevents the deep
depressions of the past” (p. 95). The financial boom-bust cycle
observed by Minsky is still very much in evidence, though it has
turned out that inflation is not an inevitable accompaniment to
financial euphoria and large deficits—consider the U.S. econ-
omy of the 1990s and 2000s.
In other words, the huge bailouts and stimulus bills that
have strained government finances will be hard to avoid in the
future. Of course, good policy across the board will help. A nar-
row focus on fiscal policy will not work, since policymakers do
not have the ability to literally “choose” the best size for the budget
deficit. Also, fiscal policy, while highly potent, has only limited
power. We can and must strive to initiate more profound reforms
even if, as Greg Mankiw (2010) asserts, “government regulators
will always be outnumbered and underpaid compared with those
whose interest it is to circumvent the regulations.” There may be
few workable alternatives to this uphill battle. 
As of now, there is still strong interest among the electorate in
reining in corporate behavior. At the same time, there is similar
populist sentiment among large numbers of Americans against the
federal government. What seems most relevant now is finding the
political will to “reinvigorate government” (Madrick 2009), as
well as to maintain Keynesian macro stimulus in the face of ide-
ological opposition and widespread mistrust of government. 
Notes
1.  Two interesting and recent critiques of standard objections to
budget deficits are Kregel 2010 and Nersisyan and Wray 2010.
2.  The op-ed piece appeared in February. D. Walker (2010), a
fiscal conservative, is still calling for short-term stimulus ini-
tiatives. Gallup polling reports that as of June, 18.3 percent
of the workforce is either unemployed or underemployed,
somewhat above the broadest government unemployment
measure, which was 16.7 percent in June (BLS 2010a; Gallup,
Inc. 2010). 
3.  For example, the LABORSTA database, maintained by the
International Labour Organization (ILO), reports that the
unemployment rate for Sweden remained below 3 percent
every year from 1969 to 1981 (ILO 2010). It remained below
4 percent every year until 1992. During this period, Sweden
ran rather large budget deficits.
4.  The details of his proposal were interesting, though. It would
remake the welfare system along the lines of the current
Social Security retirement program, which provides help to
rich and poor alike. Also, it would be available regardless of
choices about living arrangements, marriage and divorce,
and participation in the workforce. Inflating Minsky’s cal-
culations to February 2010 dollars, a program of $2,000
annual child allowances for a population of 55 million chil-
dren under 16 years of age would cost $110 billion per year
(Minsky 2008 [1986], 301).
5.  The consolidated approach to the public sector’s finances is
advocated by L. Randall Wray (1998), Stephanie Bell (2000),
and other chartalists, among others.
6.  See Figures 9-1 and 9-2 of Bryant 1983, 92–93.Public Policy Brief, No. 114 12
References
Bankruptcy Data Project at Harvard (BDP). 2010.
http://bdp.law.harvard.edu. In cooperation with
Automated Access to Court Electronic Records.
Bell, S. 2000. “Do Taxes and Bonds Finance Government
Spending?” Journal of Economic Issues 34(3): 603–20.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2010.
“Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, June
22–23.” Washington, D.C.: Federal Reserve. July 14.
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes201
00623ep.htm.
Bryant, R. C. 1983. Controlling Money: The Federal Reserve and
Its Critics. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2010a. “Economic News
Release: Table A-15, Alternative Measures of Labor
Underutilization.” July 2. Data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/print.pl/news.release/empsit.t15.htm.
———. 2010b. “Employment Status of the Civilian Population
by Sex and Age.” data.bls.gov/cgibin/print.pl/news.release/
empsit.t01.htm.
———. 2010c. “News Release: Job Openings and Labor
Turnover—April 2010.” www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/jolts.pdf.
Cecchetti, S. G., M. S. Mohanty, and F. Zampolli. 2010. “The
Future of Public Debt: Prospects and Implications.” Paper
presented at the Reserve Bank of India’s International
Research Conference,“Challenges to Central Banking in
the Context of the Financial Crisis,” Mumbai, February 2. 
Census Bureau. 2010. “Historical Poverty Tables—People.”
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census. www.census.gov/
hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2010a. The Budget and
Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020. Washington,
D.C. January.www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10871/
frontmatter.shtml.
———. 2010b. Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program—
March 2010. Washington, D.C. March. 
Darby, M. R. 1976. “Three-and-a-Half Million U.S. Employees
Have Been Mislaid: Or, an Explanation of Unemployment,
1934–1941.” Journal of Political Economy 84(1): 1–16.
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). 2010.
“Federal and State Expenditures for AFDC.” Washington,
DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and
Evaluation. aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/AFDC/baseline/4spending.pdf.
Fannie Mae. 2010. Annual Report Pursuant to 13 or 15(d) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10-K).
Washington, D.C.
Galbraith, J. K. 2006. “The Fiscal Facts: Public and Private
Debts and the Future of the American Economy.” Policy
Note 2006/2. Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Levy
Economics Institute of Bard College. February.
Gallup, Inc. 2010. “Gallup Finds Underemployment at 18.3
Percent in June, a 2010 Low.” www.gallup.com/poll/141092/
Gallup-Finds-Underemployment-June-2010-Low.aspx.
Hannsgen, G.,and D.B. Papadimitriou. 2010. “Did the New
Deal Prolong or Worsen the Great Depression?” Challenge
53(1): 63–86.
International Labour Office (ILO). 2010. LABORSTA database.
http://laborsta.ilo.org.
Kregel, J. 2010. “Fiscal Responsibility: What Exactly Does It
Mean?” Working Paper No. 602. Annandale-on-Hudson,
N.Y.: Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. June.
Madrick, J. 2009. The Case for Big Government. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press. 
Mankiw, N. G. 2010. “Trying to Tame the Unknowable.” The
New York Times, March 26.
Minsky, H. P. 2008 [1986]. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy.
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Minsky, H. P., D. B. Papadimitriou, R. J. Phillips, and L. R.
Wray. 1993. Community Development Banking. Public
Policy Brief No. 3. Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Levy
Economics Institute of Bard College. January.
Mishel, L., and D. M. Walker. 2010. “Address Jobs Now and
Deficits Later.” Politico, February 24. www.politico.com/
news/stories/0210/33444.html.
Nersisyan, Y., and L.R. Wray. 2010. Deficit Hysteria Redux? Why
We Should Stop Worrying about U.S. Government Deficits.
Public Policy Brief No. 111. Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.:
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. May.
O’Connor, J. 2002 [1973]. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.
Papadimitriou, D. B. 1999. “No Cheers for Full Employment.”
Challenge 42(6): 80–102.
Papadimitriou, D.B., and G. Hannsgen. 2009. Recent Rise in
Federal Government and Federal Reserve Liabilities:
Antidote to a Speculative Hangover. Strategic Analysis.
Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Levy Economics Institute of
Bard College. April.Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
Reinhart, C., and K. Rogoff. 2009. This Time Is Different: Eight
Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press. 
Sargent, T.,and N. Wallace. 1981. “Some Unpleasant
Monetarist Arithmetic.” Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis Quarterly Review 5(3): 1–16.
Walker, D. 2010. “Statement by David Walker to National
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform.” July 1.
www.pgpf.org/newsroom/press/DW_National_Comission/.
Willis, B., and K. Scheuble. 2010. “Economy in U.S. to Cool as
Consumers Spend Less, Survey Shows.” Bloomberg News,
July 9. www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-07-09.
Wray, L. R. 1998. Understanding Modern Money: The Key to Full
Employment and Price Stability. Northampton, Mass.:
Edward Elgar.
Zezza, G. 2010. Getting Out of the Recession? Strategic Analysis.
Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Levy Economics Institute of
Bard College. March.Public Policy Brief, No. 114 14
About the Authors
dimitri b. papadimitriou’s areas of research include financial structure reform, fiscal and mon-
etary policy, community development banking, employment policy, and the distribution of income,
wealth, and well-being. He heads the Levy Institute’s Macro-Modeling Team, studying and simu-
lating the U.S. and world economies. In addition, he has authored and coauthored studies relating
to Federal Reserve policy, fiscal policy, employment growth, and Social Security reform.
Papadimitriou is president of the Levy Institute and executive vice president and Jerome Levy
Professor of Economics at Bard College. He has testified on a number of occasions in committee
hearings of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, was vice chairman of the Trade Deficit
Review Commissionof the U.S. Congress (2000–01), and is a former member of the Competitiveness
Policy Council’sSubcouncil on Capital Allocation. He was a Distinguished Scholar at the Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences in 2002. Papadimitriou has edited and contributed to 10 books pub-
lished by Palgrave Macmillan, Edward Elgar, and McGraw-Hill, and is a member of the editorial
boards of Challenge and the Bulletin of Political Economy. He is a graduate of Columbia University
and received a Ph.D. in economics from the New School for Social Research.
Research Scholar greg hannsgenis a member of the Levy Institute Macro-Modeling Team, which
is responsible for the Institute’s Strategic Analysis series. In addition to his work for the team,
Hannsgen has conducted research on such topics as a Minskyan theory of the determinants of pri-
vate sector spending, the neglected social dimension of some consumer decisions, and fallacies in
the methods used by neoclassical economists to measure the social costs and benefits of macroeco-
nomicpolicies. He has written about his research in the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Journal
of Socio-Economics, andReview of Political Economy, and in several edited volumes. He is a coauthor
of articles in Challenge and the Social Security Bulletin. Previously, Hannsgen was a research asso-
ciate and editor at the Institute, handling the Report, the Strategic Analysis series, and numerous
policy notes and public policy briefs, mostly on macroeconomics and finance. He joined the
Institute in 2002after earning a Ph.D. in economics at the University of Notre Dame. He also holds
a B.A. in economics from Swarthmore College and M.A. degrees from Notre Dame and the Hubert
H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities.